Deregulatory Lessons from Argentina on Rent Controls
Originally published in The Daily Economy.
A country with a unique record of poor policies revealing the damaging effects of price controls has just demonstrated how effective their removal can be.
In 2020, the Argentine Congress passed a new rent regulation, promoted by Representative Daniel Lipovetzky (Cambiemos). The “Lipovetzky Law” introduced three major features: it extended the minimum lease term from two to three years, mandated annual rent adjustments based on an average of inflation and nominal wage indices, and required rents to be priced in pesos rather than dollars.
The law was implemented amidst Argentina’s high, growing, volatile inflation, and during the start of the new Kirchnerista presidency under Alberto Fernández. A perfect uncertainty combination. Unsurprisingly, the impact of this rent control law, especially in such an uncertain economic climate, was substantial. By forcing rents to be priced in pesos and making future payments unpredictable, the Lipovetzky Law imposed costs on landlords. Predictably, landlords responded by increasing initial rents on new leases or, in some cases, pulling their properties from the market altogether. In 2022, Buenos Aires had 200,000 vacant properties—a 48 percent increase since 2018. Real rental prices surged; in 2020, inflation was 36 percent, yet studio rents in Buenos Aires increased by 57.1 percent, with two-bedroom and three-bedroom units rising by 47.1 percent and 60 percent, respectively.
The situation also worsened for tenants. Before the Lipovetzky Law, landlords and tenants typically agreed on semiannual rent adjustments, with room for renegotiation. Both parties knew the exact monthly rent for a two-year lease and could adjust terms if necessary. This flexibility vanished under the new law’s automatic annual adjustment, based on inflation and wage indices. Since nominal wages often rose more slowly than inflation, tenants faced a real increase in rent, creating financial strain and making it difficult for many to meet their obligations. Though the law was intended to support tenants, it backfired — 85 percent of tenants reportedly opposed it. This outcome was so striking that the term “Lipovetzky Effect” was coined to describe policies that inadvertently achieve the opposite of their intended goals.
Predictably, a black market flourished. Reports indicated some landlords and tenants backdated lease agreements to avoid the law and engaged in informal rental agreements among friends and family.
Once President Javier Milei took office, he repealed the Lipovetzky Law by decree, which quickly reversed its effects. Rental unit supply increased by over 170 percent, and real rental prices dropped by 40 percent from October 2023 levels. Note not only the magnitude of the improvement in this market, but also the immediate effect after the Lipovetzky Law is removed. This market improvement is largely attributed to the repeal of the Lipovetzky Law, allowing landlords and tenants to once again agree on lease terms and price adjustments freely, even in dollars if preferred.
However, there’s another factor at play. Lipovetzky’s Law introduced a new level of regulatory uncertainty. But this uncertainty did not vanish with the removal of the rent controls. Now, fearing future regulations, many landlords are eager to lock in leases or sell properties before rental controls come back, or, for instance, a tax on unoccupied residential properties. Ironically, part of the recent improvement in the rental market can be traced back to this regulatory uncertainty.
The US had its own “Lipovetzke Effect” in the 1950s. In 1942, President Roosevelt’s Emergency Price Control Act included rent controls nationwide. When the act expired in 1950, New York State took a similar approach. The continued house shortage prompted a deregulation of rental units in 1953. By 1961, only New York City and 18 (out of 57) counties still had rent control. Deregulation continued at a small pace. By 2017, more than half of New York City is under one form or another of rent control.
In recent years, prominent voices in US policy have advocated for price regulations, with figures like Kamala Harris supporting anti-price-gouging measures and Elizabeth Warren blaming grocery stores for “greedflation.” 4000 years of price controls should be enough evidence.
Perhaps the US could learn a lesson in market dynamics from a “banana republic” like Argentina. There is no need to confirm the negative effects of price controls yet again.